Measuring the effect of gerrymandering on electoral competition

Government Department Lecturer David Cottrell

February 25, 2019
12:45 pm - 1:45 pm
Location
Silsby 215
Sponsored by
Program in Quantitative Social Science
Audience
Public
More information
Laura Mitchell

Using computer simulations to measure the effect of gerrymandering on electoral competition in the United States Congress

Recent research has leveraged computer simulations to identify the effect of gerrymandering on partisan bias in U.S. legislatures. As a result of this method, researchers are able to distinguish between the intentional partisan bias caused by gerrymandering and the natural partisan bias that stems from the geographic sorting of partisan voters. However, this research has yet to explore the effect of gerrymandering on other biases like reduced electoral competition and incumbency protection. Using a computer algorithm to design a set of districts without political intent, I measure the extent to which the current districts have been gerrymandered to produce safer seats in Congress. I find that gerrymandering only has a minor effect on the average district, but does produce a number of safe seats for both Democrats and Republicans.  Moreover, these safe seats tend to be located in states where a single party controls the districting process.

Location
Silsby 215
Sponsored by
Program in Quantitative Social Science
Audience
Public
More information
Laura Mitchell